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Abstract 
 
We derive the effects of credit risk transfer (CRT) markets on real sector 
productivity and on the volume of financial intermediation in a model where banks 
choose their optimal degree of CRT and monitoring. We find that CRT increases 
productivity in the up-market real sector but decreases it in the low-end segment. If 
optimal, CRT unambiguously fosters financial deepening, i.e., it reduces credit-
rationing in the economy. These effects rely upon the ability of banks to commit to 
the optimal CRT at the funding stage. The optimal degree of CRT depends on the 
combination of moral hazard, general riskiness, and the cost of monitoring in non-
monotonic ways. 
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 1 Introduction
Credit risk transfer (CRT) markets have grown immensely in recent years. Contrary
to widespread belief, CRT transactions occur to a large extent bank-to-bank and
cross-border.1 In this paper, we attempt to shed light on two questions: Why do
banks trade risks among them? And what aggregate e®ects does this have on the
¯nancial and the real sector?
We assume two types of credit market incompleteness: (a) because of information
asymmetries the ¯rm population is credit-rationed (Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)); (b)
because of geographic, regulatory and informational lending barriers (cf. Acharya
et al. (2004); Almazan (2002); Winton (2000)) the credit market is fragmented. I.e.,
a bank has a priori access only to a subsample of ¯rms.
Banks grant loans and manage their credit risks through two risk management
instruments. Monitoring in°uences ¯rm behavior and thereby mitigates moral haz-
ard (Holmstrom and Tirole (1997); Diamond (1984)). Credit risk transfers bridge
fragmented markets by giving access to the originator's loans.2 Each addresses one
of the above types of incompleteness. But an important question is how they a®ect
each other's e®ectiveness.
Several papers have already pointed out that CRT can impair banks' monitoring
incentives (Gorton and Penacchi (1995); Du®ee and Zhou (2001)).3 This view is
one-sided as one could also ask whether monitoring impedes CRT. Asking how to
optimally combine the two seems more neutral.
Such an optimum would, to address our second question, also determine the
aggregate levels of credit-rationing and market fragmentation. This is important
because, for example, there are concerns that CRT-induced monitoring losses could
reduce the supply of monitored ¯nance.
Interestingly, we ¯nd that on the aggregate (real and ¯nancial sector) levels the
two instruments work not as substitutes but rather as complements (necessitating
each other). That is, while on the institutional level extensively traded risks are
monitored less and intensively monitored risks are traded less, on the aggregate some
risks need monitoring to be tradable and some need trading to be "monitorable".
We show that CRT, if optimal, unambiguously creates ¯nancial deepening.
Moreover, there is a segment-shifting e®ect in credit markets and a two-edged pro-
ductivity e®ect in the real sector. In the proposed framework, the optimal degree of
CRT is strictly welfare increasing and completes credit markets in both dimensions.
These positive e®ects can be obtained because the volume of ¯nancial interme-
diation and ¯rm behavior are ultimately a®ected only by the price of credit which,
in turn, is in°uenced by monitoring and CRT. If CRT can reduce the price in spite
of the adverse monitoring e®ect, it induces the aforementioned e®ects.
Whether and, if so, to what extent CRT is part of the price-minimal risk man-
agement strategy depends on three factors in possibly non-monotonic ways: the
severity of moral hazard, the general riskiness of the loan, and the cost of monitor-
ing.
Finally, the optimal strategy is implementable only if banks can commit to it
vis-µ a-vis their depositors. We ¯nd that such a commitment is not feasible, if CRT is
optimal and reduces monitoring. We suggest that this creates room for regulation.
1Fitch (2004) estimated the end-2003 market size at $3 trillion worth of contracts outstanding.
The British Bankers Association (2004) presumes this number will reach $8.2 trillion by 2006.
Fitch and Standard and Poor's (2003) ¯nd that risks are largely shifted within the banking sector.
According to the ECB (2004), the bulk of European deals are bank-to-bank (80% in Germany)
and 80% of all deals are cross-border. Some banks both buy and sell protection.
2Banks have stated that their overarching motif for CRT is to diversify credit risk by acquiring
claims not accessible through regular client acquisition (ECB (2004), p.6).
3A notable exception is Arping (2004) who ¯nds the opposite in a hold-up framework.
1Except for the substitution e®ect between CRT and monitoring, all these re-
sults are novel. Our contribution to the existing literature is therefore that this
work complements and, in part, contradicts related works on this topic.
To our knowledge, two other papers explicitly analyze the e®ects of CRT on
aggregate ¯nancial and real variables. Morrison (2003) argues that CRT can cause
disintermediation and reduce productivity in the real sector, while Marsh and Wag-
ner (2004) analyze how CRT a®ects banking sector stability.
Both of them focus on the relationship between ¯rms, bank and bondholders
and the certi¯cation e®ect which bank monitoring has on bond ¯nance. They
analyze how the ¯rm's optimal choice between bank credit and bonds is a®ected by
CRT. In Morrison (2003), for example, it reduces credit demand. In contrast, we
explicitly analyze the e®ect of CRT on the relationship between ¯rms, banks and
their depositors and on banks' credit supply, while bonds are absent.
This di®erence in approach leads to results which, in some important points,
run counter to those of Morrison and of Marsh and Wagner. Moreover, we derive
a result which highlights an implicit but crucial time consistency assumption in
their models. For example, while bondholders are concerned about too much CRT,
depositors fear too little. For the most part, we believe that the results point to
various consequences of CRT the importance of which varies according to given
real-world circumstances.
The main idea underlying our model is that CRT tightens the bank's monitor-
ing incentive constraint but can relax its participation constraint. Because CRT
represents insurance (although for convenience we model it as a loan pool), it can
lower monitoring. However, CRT also reduces the bank's funding cost function, i.e.,
the deposit rate it faces for each given level of monitoring.
The sum of its funding and monitoring costs determine a bank's participation
constraint, i.e., what it requires to break even. As the monitoring cost function is
una®ected by CRT, the participation constraint is relaxed. As long as this e®ect
outweighs the monitoring loss, CRT is bene¯cial. In essence, the bank looks for its
optimal cost-incentive combination.
The bank therefore charges lower credit rates which, in turn, changes the com-
position and depth of the credit market. Obviously, this a®ects real investments.
The inherent trade-o® between CRT and monitoring is analogous to Admati and
P°eiderer's (1994) con°ict between portfolio diversi¯cation and large shareholder
monitoring in equity markets. The following quote highlights the parallels.
[W]e look at the potentially con°icting goals of achieving a high rate of
monitoring, which is promoted by concentrated ownership, and realizing
risk-sharing gains, which usually requires a more di®use pattern of own-
ership. In particular, we ask how incentives to monitor are determined
when risk-averse investors can trade freely in the market and cannot
make prior commitments to monitor ¯rms at any particular level of in-
tensity. In contrast to most ¯nancial models of asset pricing in which the
payo®s of risky securities are taken to be independent of the allocation
of shares, in our analysis the ownership structure a®ects the payo®s of
¯rms since it a®ects the amount of monitoring that occurs.4
In our case, markets are CRT markets, investors are banks, and ownership refers
to debt claims. But while Admati and P°eiderer focus on free-rider problems in
e±cient stock trades in secondary markets (as in takeovers; cf. Grossmann and
4Admati et al. (1994), p. 1098.
2Hart (1980)), we turn our attention to the consequences of this trade-o® for bank
participation in primary (credit) markets.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model
without CRT and derives its equilibrium. Section 3 introduces credit risk swaps to
the model. We derive the equilibrium and present the results of some numerical
simulations. In Section 4 we analyze a time inconsistency and possible remedies.
In Section 5 we discuss external e®ects and robustness issues. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model without CRT
2.1 The Real Sector
Imagine a representative, risk-neutral entrepreneur (¯rm) with a single project.
The project requires an initial outlay of 1 and yields R with probability qe and 0
otherwise. The entrepreneur relies on external funding only and the opportunity
cost of capital is 0.
Assume the following ¯rm e®ort problem (cf. Holmstrom and Tirole (1997)):
The entrepreneur expends either a high or low e®ort e = fh;lg with ql < qh. When
e = l (shirking), she enjoys a private bene¯t B.
2.2 The Financial Sector
Consider a ¯nancial intermediary (bank) which raises deposits in order to grant
loans to ¯rms. The bank funds the ¯rm and collects a repayment rB.
Monitoring Concurrently with ¯rm e®ort, the bank undertakes monitoring M.
M 2 (0;1) represents the probability with which the bank can impose e = h on the
¯rm (Carletti (2004)). If the ¯rm chooses e = l and the bank monitors, the project's
success probability is qM ´ ql +¢qM where ¢q ´ qh ¡ ql. Monitoring costs follow
C(M) = mM2=2. The convex shape re°ects, among other things, the increasing
marginal cost of gathering more information. The coe±cient m captures the dis-
economies of scale and denotes monitoring quality. If m is large, the technology is
poor, i.e., expensive.
Deposits Depositors deposit money in the bank and collect a repayment rD.
Deposits are pure discount debt and no Diamond-Dybvig-like demand deposits (Di-
amond and Dybvig (1983)). We assume two types of moral hazard due to bank
agency. First, dispersed depositors cannot observe the monitoring e®ort. Second,
they cannot verify the date-T project state, which allows banks to give false reports
(cf. Diamond (1984); Gale and Hellwig (1985)). We neglect state veri¯cation in the
case of ¯rm agency arguing that a large bank can easily do so.
Depositors, by choice of contract, want to mitigate these problems. We as-
sume they enhance deposits with a non-pecuniary bankruptcy penalty Á of the
following form (Diamond (1984)): Á(rD;z) = max(rD ¡ z;0) where z denotes the
actual deposit repayment.5 Under this contract, the bank will report loan returns
truthfully and choose a non-negative amount of monitoring. The drawbacks are
that the penalty is a deadweight loss when exercised and that monitoring may still
5There are two well-known weaknesses in Diamond's model: (a) the assumption of a ¯nely
attuned penalty function is unrealistic and (b) there is a lack of explicit game-theoretic analysis
involving, say, the question whether the punishment is subgame-perfect. All we need for our
purpose is that the bank's funding costs are risk-sensitive so that the bank becomes quasi-risk
averse. An economically more sound, but technically more complicated, argument for banks'
risk-sensitive capital constraint is the one in Froot and Stein (1998).
3deviate from ¯rst-best. The monitoring misalignment and the expected penalty,
EÁ = (1 ¡ q)rD, therefore comprise the bank agency costs in this model.
Competition Credit and deposit markets exhibit perfect upstream competition.
In equilibrium, only the ¯rm can have a non-negative expected pro¯t.
2.3 Information and Contracts
Only actual project return and e®orts are private knowledge. All other parameters,
including the ¯xed properties of the ¯rm (R, qh, ql, and B), are common knowledge.
The model is based purely on moral hazard.
The model features only pure discount debt contracts. The deposit contract is
supplemented by a penalty function as an incentive device. The loan contract in-
volves monitoring as a control device. We do not derive the (constrained) optimality
of these contractual designs. As in other banking models, they are given.
2.4 Equilibrium without CRT
Some proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
The sequence of events is as follows: First, the bank is funded by the depositors
and rD is set. Then, the bank can grant a loan to the ¯rm and set rB. During the
life of the loan, the bank and the ¯rm simultaneously choose M and e. Finally, all
payments (and penalties) are realized.
The model is solved backward. The equilibrium conditions are that (a) e®ort and
monitoring must be in a Nash equilibrium and (b,c) bank and depositors' expected
pro¯ts must equal 0.
If the ¯rm chooses e = h, its expected pro¯t6 is given by ¦h
F = qh(R ¡ rB).
If it chooses e = l, its pro¯t will be the weighted sum of ¦h
F and its pay-o® from
successful shirking. Thus, ¦h
F ¸ ¦l
F, if and only if qh(R ¡ rB) ¸ ql(R ¡ rB) + B.
That is, the ¯rm's choice is independent of M. Denote
µ ´ B=¢q + rh
B: (1)
For R ¸ µ, the ¯rm's dominant strategy is e = h. Otherwise, it is e = l. We speak
of h-¯rms and l-¯rms respectively. By assumption, the bank can discern the ¯rm's
type and o®er the proper contract.
2.4.1 The Case of an h-¯rm
Suppose the bank is approached by an h-¯rm. It will obviously choose M = 0 as
¯rm e®ort cannot be further improved. This provided, bank and depositor pro¯ts
are ¦h
B = qhrB ¡ rD and ¦h
D = qhrD ¡ 1. Because of the zero-pro¯t condition
rh
B = 1=q2
h and rh
D = 1=qh: (2)
Note that rh
B determines the level of µ.
2.4.2 The Case of an l-¯rm
Now suppose an l-¯rm demands credit. The bank and the depositors will then
expect ¦l
B = qMrB ¡ rD ¡ mM2=2 and ¦h
D = qMrD ¡ 1. We present the solution
in the following proposition.
6We will, henceforth, suppress "expected".
4Proposition 1 The l-equilibrium without CRT is
M¤ =
(
1 if m < ¹ m
¡mq1+
p
(mq1)2+2m¢2qrl
D
m¢q otherwise.
(3)
rl
B =
(
1=q2
h + m
2qh if m < ¹ m
¡mq1+
p
(mq1)2+2m¢2qrl
D
¢2q otherwise.
(4)
rl
D =
½
1=qh if m < ¹ m
1=qM¤ otherwise. (5)
with ¹ m =
2¢q
qh(qh+ql)
There is an interior and a corner solution. For su±ciently low m, monitoring
is so e±cient that the bank chooses the maximum intensity M¤ = 1. Once m
rises above a certain threshold, ¹ m, the optimal monitoring intensity is interior. As
m ! 1, M¤ approaches zero.
In the corner solution, project success is as likely as in an h-¯rm. Therefore,
the deposit's face value is identical. But the credit rate is higher for l-¯rms. The
premium amounts to m=2qh which in expectation, times qh, compensates the bank
for the incurred monitoring cost of m=2.
The bank's premium in the interior solution is harder to trace but the intuition
is simple. The equilibrium must satisfy the zero-pro¯t participation constraints of
the bank and depositors which can be expressed through the function
PC : rl
B(M) = 1=q2
M + mM2=2qM; (6)
plus the monitoring incentive-compatibility constraint of the bank which can also
be expressed in terms of M,
MIC : rl
B(M) = mM=¢q: (7)
(6) is a convex function (with hyperbolic and parabolic features and) with a positive
intercept, whereas (7) is linearly increasing. Their intersection yields the incentive-
compatible (credit rate) minimum. If they intersect within M 2 (0;1), the solution
is interior. Otherwise, we obtain the corner solution (see Figure 1)
Figure 1: The bank's optimization problem
5For a given M, (6) computes the credit rate required by the bank to break even.
Therein are two cost components which the bank trades o® against each other. It
can reduce the likelihood of bankruptcy and, thus, its funding costs by increasing its
total monitoring costs. Both funding and monitoring cost are di®erentiable in M,
rl
D = 1=qM and C(M), the former decreasing and the latter increasing in M. The
unconstrained minimum would solve the ¯rst-order condition of (6) which can also
be expressed as [(rl
D(M) + C(M))=qM]0 = 0. The constraint on our equilibrium,
(7), results from the bank's pro¯t maximization at date 3.
Two conditions must hold in order for the l-contract to be feasible. First, the
¯rm must be eligible: R ¸ rl
B. Second, the eligibility threshold for the l-loan must
be lower than for the h-loan: rl
B < µ. This entails the following corollary.
Corollary 1 For a given m, the l-contract is feasible if and only if rl
B(m) · R < µ.
The bank segments the market in h-¯rms (R ¸ µ) and l-¯rms (rl
B(m) · R < µ).
All other ¯rms (0 < R < rl
B(m)) are not ¯nanced.
Figure 2: Market segmentation
Figure 2 illustrates the corollary (the shape of rl
B(m) is derived in the Appendix).
Consider the arbitrary values m0 and µ0. The ¯gure depicts a situation where
µ0 > rl
B(m0) so that a market for l-contracts exists. However, one can easily see
when this is not the case. Larger B (via µ) enlarge the market for monitored ¯nance.
Higher m (via rl
B) achieve the opposite (cf. Morrison (2003), p. 9).
The economic interpretation is straightforward. In this model, the bank observes
¯rm type and chooses the proper loan contract. Provided µ > rl
B(m), there are three
market segments. The h-contract resembles an "arm's length" credit and is given
to the up-market segment. The l-contract is a "relationship" loan and granted to
the low-end segment. The worst ¯rms are not ¯nanced. In a world with symmetric
information, all ¯rms with R ¸ 1=qh would be ¯nanced.
62.4.3 Bank Agency Costs
All agency costs in this model, even the bank agency costs, are in a sense ultimately
rooted in the ¯rm e®ort problem. In order to assess, however, those costs which dis-
tinctively arise from the informational frictions between the bank and its depositors,
we can use two yardsticks: (a) a fully self-¯nanced bank or (b) a deposit-¯nanced
bank which can commit to monitoring.
Corollary 2 The optimal monitoring intensity of a fully self-¯nanced bank is lower.
In comparison, we thus have relative overmonitoring.
This results from the fact that the real marginal monitoring bene¯ts and costs are
not equated in equilibrium, as the penalty function creates an arti¯cial bene¯t of
monitoring. From the opposite angle, bankruptcies are costlier to the bank under
deposit ¯nance. So, less monitoring becomes costlier. This type of overmonitoring
is di®erent than the one noted by Carletti (2004). Carletti focuses on the fact that
banks do not internalize entrepreneurial bene¯ts, which is also the case here.7
Corollary 3 The optimal monitoring intensity of a deposit-bank which can commit
to monitoring is higher. In comparison, we thus have relative undermonitoring.
If the monitoring incentive-compatibility constraint were absent, a competitive bank
would choose the unconstrained minimum. Part of its monitoring would reduce
depositors' required face values. Thus, once these are set, the bank would ex post
have an incentive to choose a lower monitoring intensity. Therein precisely lies the
issue of incentive-compatibility. With commitment, this problem vanishes.
3 The Model with CRT
3.1 Introducing a Credit Risk Swap
Consider the previous model a region and replicate it. The only di®erence between
the twin regions shall be that their projects are uncorrelated. Suppose cross-border
loans are not possible but the banks can swap claims. Importantly, assume symmet-
ric information within the swap transaction. I.e., we disregard the adverse selection
issue in CRT transactions in order to focus on their intra-region e®ects.
CRT adds another event to our timeline. At any time during the credit period,
the two banks can swap a share 1¡® of their loans with ® 2 (0;1). A crucial issue
is whether banks can credibly commit to any ® at the funding stage. Throughout
this section we assume they can. In Section 4 we address time consistency.
3.2 Equilibrium with CRT
Our construction paves the way for a symmetric solution by assuming (a) twin
regions, (b) proportional swaps of (c) homogeneous claims only. Thanks to our
one-bank-one-¯rm setup we also rule out domestic diversi¯cation. We capitalize on
such e®ects only via CRT. Our results should be robust to these assumptions.
The equilibrium with CRT is subject to the same conditions as the one without
but it features an additional variable, ®. Thus, without an extra condition we obtain
a degree of freedom, i.e., an equilibrium for any given ®. In competitive markets,
however, banks are forced to minimize their credit rate. Therefore, in equilibrium,
the credit rate with CRT, rB1, should be minimal subject to the other constraints.
Given the symmetric solution, we can focus on region 1. Region 2 is simply its
spitting image. When convenient, we omit the regional subscript.
7To complete the picture: without penalties, increasing self-¯nance will have monitoring ap-
proach ¯rst-best from 0; with penalties, it will have monitoring approach ¯rst-best from above.
73.2.1 The Case of an h-swap
Since M = 0 and e = h strictly for h-¯rms, ® is irrelevant for the e®ort choices.
However, ® can in°uence rh
B1 and thereby µ (see (1)).The lower rh
B1, the more ¯rms
comply with µ.
Assuming the symmetric solution (rB1 = rB2), the bank's pro¯t function for
h-contracts reduces to ¦h
B = qhrh
B1 ¡rh
D1. This shows that ® has no direct bearing
on the bank. The zero-pro¯t condition leads to rh
B1 = rh
D1=qh (as in Section 2.4).
Suppose the banks swap (1¡®) under the symmetric solution. Then the pay-o®s
to bank 1 and its depositors are shown in the following table.
State S12 S10 S02 S00
Default event None Credit 2 only Credit 1 only Both
Probability q2
h qh(1 ¡ qh) qh(1 ¡ qh) (1 ¡ qh)2
Bank revenue rh
B1 ®rh
B1 (1 ¡ ®)rh
B1 0
Deposit repayment rh
D1 min(rh
D1;®rh
B1) min(rh
D1;(1 ¡ ®)rh
B1) 0
By varying ®, money is transferred between the states S10 and S02. Such transfers
should not matter to risk-neutral depositors unless the money is not taken from the
depositors' share in S10 but from the bank's. We can derive the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Let ®h denote a retention rate which maximizes the return to depositors
under the h-contract. The set of ®h is given by
min(qh;1 ¡ qh) · ®h · max(qh;1 ¡ qh) (8)
The range converges to ®h = 1=2 for qh = 1=2. For a given qh, every ®h leads to
the same deposit rate. Therefore, without loss of generality, assume ® = qh. Then
rh
D1 = max(
1
1 ¡ qh(1 ¡ qh)
;
1
qh(2 ¡ qh)
) (9)
For qh = 1=2, rh
D1 = 1:¹ 3.8 Simple calculations show that rh
D1 · rh
D strictly. Since
rh
B1 = rh
D1=qh, note that rh
D1 · rh
D , rh
B1 · rh
B , µ1 · µ. The equalities hold only
trivially for qh either 0 or 1. We summarize our ¯ndings in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 For 0 < qh < 1, CRT reduces the price of arm's length credit via
funding costs (price e®ect). This relaxes the incentive-compatibility constraint for
¯rms and increases the number of h-¯rms eligible for arm's length credit (segment-
shifting e®ect). This, in turn, raises real sector productivity in the upper segment,
while society also saves on monitoring costs (productivity+ e®ect).
The price e®ect replicates Diamond (1984). This is no surprise as in the setting of
the h-swap both ¯rm and bank e®ort problems are e®ectively absent. In contrast to
Diamond's world, however, the latent existence of the ¯rm e®ort problem produces
the additional segment-shifting and productivity+ e®ects insofar as diversi¯cation
eliminates the moral hazard for a wider subset of ¯rms.
This is not a mere redistribution of rents. Real output increases plus the econ-
omy saves on monitoring costs. But why do more ¯rms opt for high e®ort? For an
h-¯rm, a ¯rm's proceeds ensure incentive-compatibility for the ¯rm and participa-
tion of the bank. In l-¯rms, at least one constraint is always violated. CRT can
lower banks' "production" costs, hence, their required pay-o® (the price) falls. Thus,
while ¯rms' pledgeable income is unchanged, more can now satisfy their incentive-
compatibility constraint and the bank's (relaxed) participation constraint.
8I.e., 1 divided by the probability that at least one credit will pay, q2
h + 2qh(1 ¡ qh) = 3=4,
because qh = 1=2 ) rh
B1 = 2rh
D1 implies that depositors lose money only if both credits fail.
83.2.2 The Case of an l-swap
R < µ1 de¯nes the new set of l-¯rms. To better understand how CRT impacts the
bank's decision, it is helpful to derive the following lemma.
Lemma 2 Under the symmetric solution, the bank's pro¯t function is
¦l
B = qM¤
1 rl
B1 ¡ rl
D1 ¡ mM¤2
1 =2: (10)
As in the h-swap, ® has no direct bearing on the bank's pro¯t. There are two indirect
e®ects through which CRT changes the bank's rationale: through (a) monitoring
incentives M¤
1 and (b) funding costs rl
D1. The (b)-e®ect is the same as in the h-swap.
As we will see, this diversi¯cation bene¯t is traded o® against a loss in monitoring.
We now state our main result in proposition 3.
Proposition 3 For every admissible ®, there exists an l-equilibrium with CRT:
M¤
1 =
(
1 for m < ¹ m1
¡mq1+
p
(mq1)2+2m®(2¡®)¢2qrl
D1
m(2¡®)¢q otherwise.
(11)
rl
B1 =
8
<
:
r
l
D1+ m
2
qh for m < ¹ m1
¡mq1+
p
(mq1)2+2m®(2¡®)¢2qrl
D1
®(2¡®)¢2q otherwise.
(12)
rl
D1 =
8
<
:
1¡qh(1¡qh)(1¡®)r
l
B1
qh for m < ¹ m1
1¡qM¤
1
(1¡qM¤
1
)(1¡®)r
l
B1
qM¤
1
otherwise.
(13)
with ¹ m1 =
2®¢qr
l
D
(2¡®)qh+®ql
It can be shown from this proposition that CRT invokes less monitoring: Assume
more CRT lead to an increase in monitoring. Depositors would bene¯t from diversi-
¯cation and more monitoring. This would strictly decrease rl
D (see (13)). However,
lower ® and rl
D would imply a lower M¤
1 (see (11)) contradicting the assumption
that more CRT increases monitoring. This argument applies equally to ¹ m1.
Corollary 4 dM¤
1=d® > 0; ¹ m¤
1=d® > 0; ¹ m1 = ¹ m and M¤
1 = M¤ for ® = 1.
Thus, CRT decreases monitoring incentives and thereby possibly productivity in the
low-end segment of the real sector (productivity¡ e®ect).
The shedding of credit risk diminishes the bank's monitoring incentive because,
while still fully bearing the costs, it shares the bene¯ts. The swap creates a virtual
loan pool and a joint production problem with it.9
The productivity¡ e®ect implies that with CRT the low-end real sector becomes
riskier and less productive. Ironically, banks may improve in terms of e±ciency and
stability. This happens precisely when CRT reduces funding costs (which re°ect
bank risk).
So what is the price e®ect? A comparison with the previous results shows the
identity of Proposition 1 and 3 for ® = 1, and that for corner solutions rl
D1 = rh
D1
and rl
B1 = rh
B1 + C(1). Since rh
B1 · rh
B, if anything, CRT lowers prices.
9Cf. Gintschel and Hackethal (2004). The same problem arises in models of multiple bank
relationships (Carletti (2004)). In the case of many banks, this converges to the free-riding problem
of dispersed shareholders. However, the most common interpretation would be insurance. As for
all insurance, the incentive to avoid the damage event is reduced.
9The interior solution is not so straightforward. For any ®, the bank still chooses
its incentive-compatible minimum (see 2.4.2) equating the participation constraint
with its monitoring-incentive constraint. These are now functions of M and ®:
PC : rl
B1(M;®) = rl
B(M) ¢
qM
1¡®(1¡qM) (14)
MIC : rl
B1(M;®) = rl
B(M)=® (15)
with rl
B(M) being the respective RHS of (6) and (7). CRT (lower ®) relaxes the
participation constraint but tightens the incentive-compatibility constraint, i.e., it
reduces the bank's cost pressure but worsens its monitoring incentives. The com-
posite e®ect is ambiguous (see Figure 3).
Figure 3: The impact of ® on the bank's PC and MIC
Why is the participation constraint relaxed? The monitoring cost function C(M)
is not a®ected by ®. Funding costs, on the other hand, are:
rl
D1(M;®) = rl
D(M) ¡ qM(1 ¡ qM)(1 ¡ ®)rl
B1: (16)
with rl
D from Proposition 1. While (16) collapses to rl
D = 1=qM for ® = 1, it
is clearly di®erent otherwise. In other words, each ® represents another funding
cost function. Under our competitive assumptions, the bank chooses that function
which, in interaction with (15), generates the global incentive-compatible minimum.
In fact, we may claim that the bank opts to produce the most price-competitive
loan even though (12) does not give us any explicit solution. This also minimizes
the eligibility threshold for l-contracts.
Proposition 4 A competitive credit market will force the bank to adopt that ®¤
which leads to the globally minimal rl
B1(®¤;M¤) (price e®ect). If ®¤ < 1, then a
positive amount of CRT is optimal. If CRT is optimal, a wider range of ¯rms will
be eligible for l-contracts compared to the case without CRT (¯nancial deepening
e®ect).
If optimal, CRT deepens credit supply. Contrary to fears that monitoring disincen-
tives imperil the market for monitored ¯nance, we ¯nd that even though banks are
inclined to monitor l-¯rms less, they are willing to ¯nance more of them. Although,
owing to bank agency, some credit-rationing will remain (rl
B ¸ rh
B > 1=qh), external
¯nancing and economic activity will draw nearer to ¯rst-best.
Monitoring and CRT are distinct risk management instruments. They are sub-
stitutes: CRT reduces a bank's funding costs but also its marginal return from
10monitoring. Considering the costs and bene¯ts, banks can strike the optimal bal-
ance. But they are also complements: While obviously l-¯rm risks need monitoring
to be transferable, the deepening result shows that some actually need CRT to be
monitorable. Markets are completed domestically as well as across borders.10
3.2.3 Bank Agency Costs
In Section 2.4.3, we argued that bank agency costs comprise expected penalty and
monitoring misalignment. Clearly, if optimal, CRT reduces expected penalty costs
as banks become safer. With respect to monitoring, the conclusion depends on the
benchmark. Compared to a deposit-bank which can commit to monitoring, CRT
would aggravate undermonitoring. In this view, monitoring losses are clearly bad.
But compared to a fully self-¯nanced bank, CRT would mitigate overmonitoring.
More precisely, "free-riding" would counterbalance "over-incentivization" and mon-
itoring, drawn between two evils, would near ¯rst-best. Overall, CRT would reduce
penalty costs and the monitoring misalignment "killing two birds with one stone".
3.3 Numerical Simulation
This subsection provides some numerical simulations in order to more clearly as-
sess the e®ects that our model parameters have on the CRT equilibrium. We
simulated the system in Proposition 3 and examined the e®ect of qh, ql, and m
on the optimal M¤-®¤-combination. In particular, we varied m = (0:1;6) and
(qh;ql) = f(0:9;0:1);(0:9;0:7);(0:7;0:3);(0:5;0:3);(0:6;0:5)g .
Lacking explicit solutions, we ¯rst computed equilibria by gradually increasing
® from 0.1 to 1. We then searched the resultant subset of admissible ® for the one
with the lowest associated credit rate. The result is shown in Figures 4 and 5.
Optimal monitoring M¤ is positively related to the degree of moral hazard and
negatively to the cost of monitoring. However, ®¤ behaves non-monotonically due
to the interplay of two e®ects.
The e®ect of riskiness in general Consider the extremes m = 0 and m À 0.
In the ¯rst case, the bank chooses M = 1 always so that rl
D = 1=qh and
rl
B = 1=q2
h + m=2 ¼ 1=q2
h. Since monitoring is una®ected by CRT, the bank
will maximally exploit diversi¯cation and choose its minimum admissible ®, i.e.,
®¤ = ® = max(rD=rB;1 ¡ rD=rB) (see Lemma 7 in the proof of Proposition 3)
which translates into ®¤ = max(qh;1 ¡ qh).
In the second case, the bank chooses M ¼ 0 so that rl
D = 1=ql and rl
B =
1=q2
l + mM2=2 ¼ 1=q2
l . Monitoring is nearly insensitive to CRT. The bank will
therefore choose ®¤ = max(ql;1 ¡ ql) in the limit.
That is, at the poles, the optimal degrees of CRT are independent of moral
hazard as monitoring grows insensitive to CRT. Instead they depend on the level
of qh and ql, or the respective general riskiness of the ¯rm.
Denote ®¤
f(m) for two loans f = 1;2. Whenever ®¤
1(0) > ®¤
2(0) and ®¤
1(1) <
®¤
2(1), their curves in Figure 5 will cross. Consider, e.g., (0:6;0:5) and (0:5;0:3).
Every curve will travel from max(qh;1¡qh) to max(ql;1¡ql). For (0:9;0:1), this
journey both starts and ends at 0.9. However, in the process its ® falls and rises
again so that (absent other e®ects) its curve is V-shaped. It would, for example,
cross with (0:7;0:3) even though its ®¤ is higher at both ends. Some curves would
even cross twice, e.g., (0:9;0:1) and (0:8;0:7) (not depicted).
10By subdividing risks CRT leads to an adding of risks to the bank sector. As the bank sector
grows its aggregate risk could rise (Diamond (1984); Samuelson (1963)). Some would argue that
this is destabilizing (cf. Marsh and Wagner (2004)). However, we prefer to view it as e±cient.
11Figure 4: M¤
Figure 5: ®¤
These intricate e®ects owe themselves to the e®ect of general riskiness and the
admissibility restriction on ® (cf. ¯rst and second limit in Lemma 7). They are not
easily visible in Figure 5 as they are distorted by the second e®ect.
12Saving monitoring incentives According to the ¯rst e®ect, gradually decreas-
ing M should take the ¯rm's success probability from qh to ql. For qh > ql ¸ 0:5,
®¤(m) should be monotonically decreasing; for qh > 0:5 > ql, V-shaped; and for
0:5 ¸ qh > ql, monotonically increasing. Although (0:9;0:1), (0:7;0:3), and (0:9;0:7)
obey this course at the ends, they feature a hump in-between.
Consider, for example, (0:9;0:1) where ®¤(m) = 1 for approximately 1:8 < m <
4:6. This indicates that the bank is not making maximum use of diversi¯cation
everywhere. In fact, here, it makes no use of it.
Quite simply, it prefers to save its monitoring incentive. As would be expected
from the ¯rst e®ect, (0:9;0:1) initially decreases from 0.9. But at around ®¤(0:8) ¼
0:65, it turns around and starts to rise again. All the while, Figure 4 tells us, the
bank retains M¤ = 1. That is, now that m is so high that the bank must make
a trade-o® between monitoring and CRT, monitoring is so valuable that the bank
would rather forego some CRT.
As m increases further, the comparative advantage of monitoring declines. At
m ¼ 4:6, the marginal net value created by monitoring falls below the marginal
value of CRT. So, ®¤ begins to fall again. As M¤ continually decreases with m, the
¯rst e®ect will eventually kick in and ®¤(m) will make a ¯nal turn towards 0.9.
Where there is a hump, monitoring "undermines CRT incentives".
When monitoring is important, there is less CRT. Since the value of monitoring
increases with the severity of moral hazard, the model predicts less CRT origination
(a) in high moral hazard loans and (b) by banks with mainly relationship-intensive
loans on their books.
If one sees publicly listed companies, often externally rated and forced to comply
with high transparency standards, as low moral hazard (i.e. bank monitoring is less
crucial) and small and medium-sized enterprizes (SME) as high moral hazard loans,
then recent empirical ¯ndings support our predictions. According to S&P (2003),
up to 90% of CRT involve large listed companies (low moral hazard loans), while
CRT for SME (high moral hazard) loans is rarer. Moreover, the ECB (2004) ¯nds
that specialized banks with a narrow customer base tend to sell rather than buy
protection. A third study on international CRT markets by Fitch (2003) con¯rms
that protection selling is mainly concentrated among smaller regional banks, while
protection buying is predominant among larger banks. What emerges seems to be
a structure where larger banks with low moral hazard loans act as originators and
market makers for peripheral banks with more relationship-intensive loans.
The model also predicts more protection buying in environments where banks are
either very e±cient11 or hardly involved in corporate governance (the ¯rst e®ect).
Conversely, mediocre monitoring technologies are less conducive to CRT.
4 Time Consistency
4.1 The Commitment Problem
CRT bene¯ts come from changes in the funding cost function of the bank, i.e., the
cost of deposits. A question that therefore arises is whether the bank, once funded,
has an incentive to deviate from the CRT promise made to depositors. Proposition
5 answers this question.
11According to ECB (2004), CRT may help banks establish relationships without excessive
cluster risks. Along the same lines: "Increasingly, these credit derivatives allow banks to maintain
value-added relationships without necessarily acting as 'buy and hold' lenders" (Fitch (2003),
p.6); "[CRT can] divorce the client relationship from the risk decision" (S&P (2003), p.7). This is
precisely our result for small m. Cf. also the benchmark solution in Marsh and Wagner (2004).
13Proposition 5 ® = 1 is ex post dominant whenever M¤
1 < 1. The promise of ®¤
is time inconsistent whenever ®¤ < 1 and M¤
1 < 1. Forward-looking depositors will
foreclose CRT in these cases.
Intuitively, assume depositors are naive. When making loans the bank, if anything,
would already have reaped any bene¯ts from CRT via lower funding costs. This
provided, CRT incentives vanish. Indeed, the bank would, on the contrary, rather
abstain from CRT to avoid eroding its monitoring incentives. This would increase its
expected pro¯t. In competitive credit markets, it must forfeit this rent by lowering
its credit rates even further. In fact, it would be pressured to dilute its deposits.
This moral hazard is quite in the spirit of the asset substitution problem12: the
debtor (the bank) has ex post incentives to opt for a riskier strategy. In asset
substitution models, the debtors' rationale for making cash-°ows riskier depends on
their being residual claimants and on limited liability. Here, owing to the penalty
the bank is, from its own perspective, fully liable.
In our case, the bank is not concerned with transferring money from shortfall to
solvent states. Its goal is to increase the probability of the solvent state by preserving
its incentive to monitor. This is achieved by not conducting CRT.
Given our previous results, the foreclosure of CRT is a welfare loss. Apparently,
the penalty function does not preclude this type of opportunism.
4.2 Ex Ante Measures
Bank equity Consider a bank funding ¯ of its capital from its own pocket:
¦l
B = qMrl
B ¡ rl
D + ¯(rl
D ¡ 1) ¡ mM2=2: (17)
¯ achieves the same as ®, namely a fall in funding costs, only without hampering
monitoring incentives. The reduction is ¯(rl
D ¡ 1) where (rD ¡ 1) is the external
funding premium. Obviously, for ¯ = 1 bank agency costs are zero.
Bank equity substitutes and gradually reduces the need for CRT. But it cannot
prevent foreclosure when CRT is still bene¯cial. It also neglects wealth constraints.
Credit market power Consider a bank with some credit market power so that it
has some leeway in setting rl
B. Ceteris paribus, this reinforces monitoring incentives,
as can be seen from the incentive constraint M¤
1 = ®¢qrl
B1=m.
This has three e®ects: First, there are more corner solutions M¤
1 = 1, which are
not subject to the time inconsistency. Second, more monitoring reduces rl
D. Third,
rising rl
B and falling rl
D imply changes in the range of admissible ®.
That is, credit market power can reduce the need and range of CRT plus elim-
inate the commitment problem for a larger subset of ¯rms. But the lower ¯rms'
pledgeable income, the weaker the e®ects. When constraints bind (R = rl
B), there
are none. The e®ects thus dwindle as we approach the credit market frontier.
4.3 Ex Post Measures
Reputation We ask whether the deterrence e®ect of ex post punishment can
overcome the problem. For instance, what if in a repeated game banks would lose
future deposits by violating past promises? Put di®erently, could the bank build
up a reputation for good risk management, i.e., stability?
Not surprisingly, such a reputation mechanism can exist for appropriate para-
meters for, say, the expected value of continuation (see Appendix for a discussion).
12Often also referred to as risk-shifting or excessive risk-taking. See also, closely related to our
setup, Hellwig (1998).
14One can virtually calibrate the preferred equilibrium. Notwithstanding this, repu-
tational mechanisms between small depositors and banks seem not out of place.
However, the reputation argument relies on the assumption that depositors can
observe ®. In reality, CRT and, more generally, risk management are rather opaque
(cf. Morrison (2003)). Moreover, one can argue that depositors lack sophistication
or that such surveillance is costly and akin to monitoring (to avoid which they went
to the bank). Alternatively, inferences from the bank's ex post performance su®er
from noise leading to unwarranted punishment and the forgiveness problem.
Also, if ® were observable it is unclear why depositors would not take measures
before their deposits drown. In other words, the reputation argument seems to
imply that ® is indeed observable but unveri¯able or, at least, costly to verify.
A market response to these criticisms seems to be that banks, which frequently
tap markets for funding, face shorter maturities on their liability side and through
rating agencies disclose their ex ante bank risks.
Risk-Sensitive Capital Regulation Consider a public agency P which, on be-
half of depositors, monitors (supervises) banks. Assume it is (a) su±ciently sophis-
ticated, (b) can coordinate the costs of supervision, and (c) due to its public nature
veri¯es what it observes.
Let it provide deposit insurance, supervise the bank, and ask a capital require-
ment K from the bank to cover potential damages. Upon insolvency, P becomes the
bank's creditor and the depositors' insurer. Let s denote expected deposit shortfall
and t additional costs incurred by P including expected bankruptcy costs such as
administrative costs from bankruptcy proceedings or political costs. P's expected
pay-o® is given by ¦P = K ¡ s(®) ¡ t(®).13
Let ®¤ = argmin® rB subject to participation and incentive constraints. Sup-
pose P is benevolent and wants to break even, K(®) = s(®) + t(®). The bank's
pro¯t is then ¦B = qM(®)rB ¡ 1 ¡ t(®) ¡ C(®).
Apart from t, funding costs are 1 as for a fully self-¯nanced bank. Here t
represents the external funding premium.
Proposition 6 Suppose a public agency insures deposits, supervises banks, and
requires prudent capital equal to its total expected bankruptcy costs K(®) = s(®) +
t(®). If K(®) is ex interim risk-sensitive, banks will stick to K(®¤).
This is not surprising. Since K more or less represents funding costs, to let P adjust
K is equivalent to having depositors change post-CRT deposit rates. In a sense, K
replaces rl
D with the di®erence that, by assumption, P can use K to discipline banks.
In reality, such ex post measures are apparently performed by public authorities
and rating agencies who hold banks accountable for risk management. Regulations
make capital requirements increasingly risk-sensitive. Internal credit ratings per-
formed by banks gained importance, as have external ratings, in the context of
which the new capital adequacy rules (Basel II) played a key role. Finally, investors
seem to react by adjusting funding rates, exchanging management, or coercing the
sale of excessive risks. The question is whether CRT e®ects are properly treated.
This ¯nding is not unexpected. If risk-sensitive capital requirements are intended
to let banks internalize the costs of excessive risk-taking, logically, they also work
against insu±cient risk-shedding. One is simply the mirror image of the other.
13Of course, P only has a non-negative expectancy provided that it gets to keep the capital even
in the case of solvency. Although real-world capital requirements would be returned, if a bank
quit its operations for other reasons than bankruptcy, this is hardly ever observed. Rather, banks
stay in business as long as they do not go entirely bankrupt, while required capital - albeit varying
- stays with the regulator all along. That is, in practice, the capital is "owned" by the regulator,
unless the event for which it was provisioned actually materializes.
155 Model Discussion
External e®ects We have drawn a fairly positive picture of what we consider to
be the direct e®ects of CRT. A word of caution is warranted, however, with regard
to any welfare predictions, for there could be important indirect or external e®ects.
At the heart of Morrison (2003) and Marsh and Wagner (2004) is an infor-
mational spill-over from banks to bondholders. For the latter, bank monitoring
certi¯es the ¯rm quality. Banks do not internalize these bene¯ts and care little if,
due to CRT, this function su®ers. According to Morrison, for example, this may
lead to welfare-decreasing disintermediation.
Other stakeholders may bene¯t from banks' presence in corporate governance.
For example, Perotti and von Thadden (2004) argue that employees have similar
risk preferences regarding ¯rm investments. In fact, they propose society might po-
litically delegate corporate control to banks. In this view, a loss in bank monitoring
would harm labor interests.
Another issue could be non-internalized "social" costs of bank failures (Marsh
and Wagner (2004)). These could arise, e.g., from a breakdown of payment systems,
counterparty risks or, more generally, systemic risks. If aggregate or systemic bank
sector risks rose due to CRT, these dangers could grow.
It should be emphasized that, in all three models, banking sector risk refers to
the risk of a portfolio of independent banks and not systemic risks, e.g., due to
¯nancial contagion among connected banks. This is important because CRT might
have e®ects on the latter. Intuitively, the structure of liabilities in CRT markets is
reminiscent of interbank markets in Allen and Gale (2000).
Such and other potential external e®ects certainly warrant more attention.
Diversi¯cation We have neglected other means of diversi¯cation apart from di-
rect lending or CRT. For example, banks could simply buy shares or give interbank
market loans to other banks. In fact, in our one-bank-one-loan model, this would be
identical to CRT. In reality, however, this would not allow banks to trade speci¯c
loan risks.14 CRT, on the contrary, allows to isolate speci¯c credit risks, also from
other types of risk. Furthermore, CRT unbundles cash-°ow and control rights.
Banks could also simply merge and thus unite their credit markets. A "cross-
border" merger (or acquisition) would achieve diversi¯cation without monitoring
losses. However, empirical evidence on bank mergers points to potential drawbacks.
For example, mergers typically entail immense integration costs; bigger banks could
also worsen internal incentives (Cerasi and Daltung (2000)); there could be special-
ization advantages so that, conversely, merging would involve diseconomies of scope.
Finally, depositors themselves could split their deposits among di®erent banks.
This would be futile. Recall the risk-neutral assumption: diversi¯cation per se has
no value. Bank diversi¯cation is bene¯cial because banks plunder their own state-
contingent surplus to stu® depositors' shortfall states. "Split" depositors would de-
mand proportional repayments from each bank. Without trading in state-contingent
claims, the banks face the same funding costs as before. This e®ect is also obtained
when investors spread their savings directly among ¯rms in Diamond (1984).
Competition We assumed that banks are Bertrand competitors on credit mar-
kets but hold complete bargaining power in deposit markets, and not double Bertrand
competition(DBC) where banks are price-competitors in both.15 In the same way in
14The ECB (2004) study cites as one of the main motifs for CRT transactions the reduction of
risks related to single entities. Also, the surveys by Fitch (2003,2004; p. 8 and p. 4 respectively)
and by the BBA (2004), p. 2) point out that single-name credit default swaps make up the lion's
share of trade in CRT markets. They are by far the most popular product.
15Cf. Yanelle (1997) and Freixas and Rochet (1997).
16which DBC aggravates asset substitution (Hellmann et al. (2000)), it could foreclose
CRT: competing for deposits could provoke ex post risk-taking by banks. Facing
higher deposit rates banks might have to avoid monitoring erosion and abstain from
CRT to preserve a no-loss.
Another alternative is to give banks more credit market power. We have already
hinted at some consequences. More generally, banks could reap diversi¯cation gains
but continue to price loans on a stand-alone basis. They would bear less risk than
compensated for.
Collusion Unlike in Morrison (2003), there is no collusion between banks and
¯rms. The bank has an isolated moral hazard incentive. Firms could side with
banks, but also with depositors as more monitoring lowers their own pay-o®. They
might even want to bribe the bank to conduct CRT.
If it were (a) possible and (b) lucrative for the ¯rm to bribe the bank and (c)
the bank could, in return, commit to conduct CRT, then optimal CRT could be
saved. However, ¯rms could also bribe banks to reduce monitoring per se without
recourse to CRT. For neither banks nor ¯rms have any direct ex post bene¯t from
CRT, only from monitoring.
Bribing for less monitoring resembles junk bond ¯nance (cf. Morrison (2003)).
To allow this, we would need assume that banks can commit not to monitor contra-
dicting our assumption that monitoring is not contractible. Without bondholders,
by assumption, unable to monitor, the "bribe market" would not work properly.
Other robustness issues Neither a linear monitoring cost function16 nor a con-
tinuous ¯rm e®ort change the thrust of our results.
The same holds true for employing a perfect hedge or an asymmetric swap. All
that is needed is simply a trade in di®erent state-contingent claims.
Needless to say, our common knowledge assumptions are important. Adverse
selection would clearly complicate matters. A discussion of these issues relating to
CRT markets can be found in Du®ee and Zhou (2001) and Plantin (2003).
6 Conclusion
We have analyzed the e®ects of credit risk transfer (CRT) on aggregate ¯nancial in-
termediation and the real sector. We showed that CRT alters a bank's participation
and monitoring incentive constraints. In competitive markets, the bank chooses the
optimal combination of CRT and monitoring. If optimal, positive CRT creates
¯nancial deepening. It also increases productivity in the up-market and lowers it
in the low-end segment of the real sector. Welfare e®ects are overall positive and
are obtained when banks can be committed to the optimal level of CRT. The latter
depends on the severity of moral hazard, the general riskiness of the loan, and the
cost of monitoring in non-monotonic ways.
Based on these ¯ndings, banks should be encouraged to undertake CRT - not
only to shift risks to other, presumably less fragile sectors but also within the
banking sector - as neither the real sector nor the banking sector seem to su®er
from CRT. A critical issue that still prevails is the opacity of CRT markets. We
have shown that banks have an incentive for moral hazard and might thus abstain
from undertaking bene¯cial CRT transactions. To reduce the opacity, it seems
essential that regulatory authorities force banks to disclose their CRT deals.
16Cf. Carletti's (2004) discussion of how a linear monitoring cost technology a®ects results. In
fact, the basic setup of our model would converge to Morrison's (2003) discrete monitoring variable
setup. Banks would either monitor fully or not at all. Our basic results would remain the same.
17A word of caution is warranted, however. We consider our ¯ndings to be the ¯rst-
order e®ects of CRT. Still, we believe that a ¯nal welfare assessment additionally
warrants the analysis of external e®ects omitted in this paper. This would seem to
be a natural starting point for future research.
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20A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The bank's pro¯t function is
¦l
B = qMrl
B ¡ rD ¡ mM2=2 (18)
Monitoring: The bank will choose M¤ = argmaxM ¦l
B the solution of which
is M¤ = min(¢qrB=m;1) where the corner solution is obtained for m < ¹ m ´ ¢qrB.
Credit rate: Plug the monitoring solution back into (18), set it equal to zero,
and solve for rl
B. Plug the solution back into M¤ = min(¢qrB=m;1) and ¹ m. The
expressions thus obtained for rl
B and M¤ are shown in the proposition.
Deposit rate: Depositors require rl
D(M) = 1=qM. As M 2 [0;1], note that
rD 2 [1=ql;1=qh].
We have the functions M = Ã(rl
D) and rl
D = '(M) and are looking for ¯x points
of Ã('(M)), i.e., where M¤ and rl
D are mutually best responses.
Corner solution: If m < ¹ m, then M¤ = 1 which implies qM¤ = qh. Suppose
depositors choose rl
D = 1=qh. Plugging this back into ¹ m yields m < q
¡1
h 2¢q=(qh+ql)
which is exhibited in the proposition. I.e., for l-¯rms whose qh and ql satisfy this
condition, the corner solution exists.
Interior solution: For m > q
¡1
h 2¢q=(qh + ql), we get the interior solution of
M¤(rl
D) and rl
D(M) = 1=qM. Plug rl
D(M) into M¤(rl
D) and bring everything on
the LHS. Denote the cubic term on the LHS as f(M¤).
f(M¤) = m¢q2M¤3 + 3mql¢qM¤2 + 2mq2
l M¤ ¡ 2¢q (19)
We look for M¤ such that f(M¤) = 0.
Lemma 3 lim+1 f(M¤) = +1 and lim¡1 f(M¤) = ¡1.
Lemma 4 The local maximum is left of the origin.
Proof: The ¯rst-order condition yields
M
opt
1;2 = ¡
ql
¢q
§
s
q2
l
3¢2q
:
Strictly, M
opt
2 < 0. Because of Lemma 3 this must be the maximum. 2
Lemma 5 At least one M in (0;1) solves f(M¤) = 0.
Proof: f(0) = ¡2¢q < 0. The condition for f(1) > 0 turns out to be
m > q
¡1
h 2¢q=(qh + ql) = ¹ m, our condition for interior solutions. Thus,
for m > ¹ m, there exists at least one interior solution. 2
Lemma 6 There is exactly one M in (0;1) which solves f(M¤) = 0.
Proof: Follows from Lemmas 4 and 5. 2
A.2 Shape of rl
B(m) in Figure 2
To derive the properties of rl
B(m) in Figure 2, plug (4) into R ¸ rl
B:
R ¸
1
q2
h
+
m
2qh
if m · ¹ m; (20)
R ¸
¡mq1 +
q
(mq1)2 + 2m¢2qrl
D
¢2q
if m > ¹ m: (21)
21Note that (a) for m = ¹ m ) rl
D = 1=qh, (20) and (21) collapse to 2q
¡1
h =(qh+ql); (b)
for m = 0, (21) cannot apply and (20) collapses to rl
B = 1=q2
h; (c) for 0 · m · ¹ m,
(20) holds and it is linear in m with slope 2¡1=qh; (d) for m > ¹ m the slope of
rl
B(m) is smaller than 2¡1=qh. If the bank were to continue maximum monitoring,
the slope would remain 2¡1=qh. However, the bank reduces monitoring as the
marginal cost thereof grows larger than the marginal bene¯t. Since no change in M
would have rl
B rise linearly with 2¡1=qh in m, an optimal change (here, reduction)
in M implies that rl
B's slope is less than 2¡1=qh. In fact, as M falls further, the
slope must gradually decrease; (e) limm!1 rl
B(m) = 1=q2
l because limm!1 M¤ = 0
and M¤ = 0 ) rl
B = 1=q2
l .
For any given m, rl
B(m) is the bank's required minimum credit rate for l-¯rms.
If this threshold is greater than µ, any ¯rm which is eligible for the l-contract is also
eligible for the h-contract. Needless to say, any ¯rm would prefer the latter.
A.3 Proof of Corollary 2
A self-¯nanced bank o®ers an h-¯rm rh
SFB = 1=qh < 1=q2
h. Therefore, µSFB < µ.
I.e., fewer ¯rms are monitored.
It o®ers the following to an l-¯rm (repeat the steps from A.1 with rD = 1):
M¤
SFB =
(
1 for m < ¹ mSFB
¡mq1+
p
(mq1)2+2m¢2q
m¢q otherwise.
(22)
rl
SFB =
(
1=qh + m
2qh for m < ¹ mSFB
¡mq1+
p
(mq1)2+2m¢2q
¢2q otherwise.
(23)
with ¹ mSFB =
2¢q
2qh+ql
Clearly, ¹ mSFB < ¹ m and M¤
SFB < M¤ for m > ¹ mSFB. As a result, M¤
SFB =
M¤ = 1 for m < ¹ mSFB, while M¤
SFB < M¤ otherwise.
A.4 Proof of Corollary 3
Take the depositors' zero-pro¯t condition, rl
D = 1=qM, and plug it into the bank's
zero-pro¯t condition: qMrl
B ¡ 1=qM ¡ mM2=2 = 0. Solve for rl
B. Form the ¯rst-
order condition @rB=@M = 0. This will yield unconstrained cost-minimal M and
rl
B. We receive a cubic equation g(M) analogous to f(M) in (19).
g(M) = 1=2(m¢2qM3 + 3mql¢qM2 + 2mq2
l M) ¡ 2¢q (24)
f(M) = m¢2qM3 + 3mql¢qM2 + 2mq2
l M ¡ 2¢q (25)
One can check that f and g always have one intersection at M = 0 and none for
M > 0. Since, obviously, limM!1 f > limM!1 g, this means that for any M¤ > 0
and M+ > 0 for which f(M¤) = g(M+) = 0, it must hold that M¤ < M+.
A.5 Proof of Lemma 1
Figure 6 is a simple graphic proof. Suppose rh
B1 < 2rh
D1. Since rh
B1 = rh
D1=qh, this
is equivalent to qh > 1=2. The state pay-o®s in S10 and S02 (the other states are
irrelevant) can then be represented by Figure 6(a). By inspection, as long as both
bins do not exceed the cut-o® point rh
D1, expected deposit return is maximal. The
condition for this, ®rh
B1 · rh
D1 ^ (1 ¡ ®)rh
B1 · rh
D1, can be transformed to
qh · ® · 1 ¡ qh: (26)
22Now suppose rh
B1 > 2rh
D1 which is equivalent to qh < 1=2 (and illustrated in Figure
6(b)). Here, deposit return is maximal if no bin is smaller than the cut-o® point.
The respective condition, ®rh
B1 ¸ rh
D1 ^ (1 ¡ ®)rh
B1 ¸ rh
D1, can be transformed to
qh ¸ ® ¸ 1 ¡ qh: (27)
Finally, suppose rh
B1 = 2rh
D1, i.e. qh = 1=2. Clearly, maximum deposit return is
only achieved by equalizing both bins to the cut-o® point (Figure 6(c)).
Figure 6: Proof of Lemma 2
A.6 Proof of Lemma 2
When bank 1 faces an l-¯rm, its pro¯t is given by
¦l
B1 = qM1qM2[®rl
B1 + (1 ¡ ®)rl
B2] + qM1(1 ¡ qM2)®rl
B1
+qM2(1 ¡ qM1)(1 ¡ ®)rl
B2 ¡ rl
D1 ¡ mM2
1=2: (28)
We assume the symmetric solution for the entire game, i.e., we assume rD1 = rD2
and rB1 = rB2. Plugging these into (28) yields
¦l
B = qM1®rl
B1 + qM2(1 ¡ ®)rl
B1 ¡ rl
D1 ¡ mM2
1=2: (29)
The ¯rst-order condition with respect to M1 gives M¤
1(rl
B1;®) = min(1;®¢qrl
B1=m)
where the corner solution is obtained for m < ¹ m1 ´ ®¢qrB1. The solution for bank
2 is analogous so that M¤
1 = M¤
2. Plugging this identity into (29) yields
¦l
B = qM¤
1 rl
B1 ¡ rl
D1 ¡ mM¤2
1 =2: (30)
A.7 Proof of Proposition 3
Monitoring: A.6. Credit rate: Plug M¤
1(rl
B1;®) = min(1;®¢qrl
B1=m) into (30),
set equal to zero, and solve for rl
B1. Re-substitute the solution into M¤
1(rl
B1;®) =
min(1;®¢qrl
B1=m). Both solutions are shown in the proposition. Deposit rate:
To determine rl
D1, we introduce a reasonable restriction on ®.
Lemma 7 Any admissible ® must satisfy the following condition:
® ¸ max(rl
D1=rl
B1;1 ¡ rl
D1=rl
B1): (31)
Proof: The restriction is equivalent to Lemma 1. The "diversi¯cation"
is the same for all ®h. Since smaller ® lead to higher monitoring losses
(see Proposition 4), it is only rational to choose the maximal ®h.
23The following just restates what we just said. Consider, again, what the
swap achieves. First, look at the case without risk transfer, ® = 1, from
the perspective of the depositors of Bank 1.
State S12 S10 S02 S00
Default None Credit 2 only Credit 1 only Both
Prob q2
M¤ qM¤(1 ¡ qM¤) qM¤(1 ¡ qM¤) (1 ¡ qM¤)2
Credit rl
B1 rl
B1 0 0
Deposit rl
D1 rl
D1 0 0
Since rl
B ¡ rl
D > 0, what the swap achieves is to transfer some of the
bank's surplus in S10 to S02. Doing so increases the depositors' expected
repayment, since the money is taken from the bank.
St. S12 S10 S02 S00
Def. None Credit 2 only Credit 1 only Both
Prob q2
M¤ qM¤(1 ¡ qM¤) qM¤(1 ¡ qM¤) (1 ¡ qM¤)2
Cr. rl
B1 ®rl
B1 (1 ¡ ®)rl
B1 0
Dep. rl
D1 min(rl
D1;®rl
B1) min(rl
D1;(1 ¡ ®)rl
B1) 0
Thus, it is good for the depositors to shift credit returns from S10 to
S02 as long as the money is taken from the bank's surplus. The bank
should stop (a) when money begins to be taken from depositors in S10,
i.e., when ® = rl
D1=rl
B1, or (b) when it starts to transfer to itself in S02,
i.e., when (1 ¡ ®)rl
B1 = rl
D1. Call (a) the ¯rst and (b) the second limit.
Given that no more diversi¯cation is achieved if ® falls below of any of
these limits but monitoring continues to be reduced, the larger of the
limits represents the minimum rationally admissible ®. 2
Lemma 7 allows us to represent the depositors' zero-pro¯t condition as
q2
M¤
1 rl
D1 + qM¤
1 (1 ¡ qM¤
1 )rl
D1 + qM¤
1 (1 ¡ qM¤
1 )(1 ¡ ®)rl
B1 = 1
where the LHS is the expected deposit repayment if the ¯rst limit applies. Solving
this equation for rl
D1 yields the expression shown in the proposition. It includes the
second limit case. For ® = 1 ¡ rl
D1=rl
B1 and rl
B1 ¸ 2rl
D1, this expression turns into
rl
D1 = [qM¤(2 ¡ qM¤)]¡1 which is the analogous solution if the second limit binds
before the ¯rst one. Note also that qM¤ = qh for m < ¹ m®.
A.8 Proof of Proposition 5
The promise of ® is time inconsistent if the bank has an incentive to deviate from
it ex post. Assume (a) that the bank has promised ®¤ at date 0 and (b) that the
depositors, in good faith, have chosen to demand the face value rl
D1(®¤), and (c)
that the bank granted an l-loan at rl
B1(®¤). Thus, after the loan approval the pro¯t
function of the bank is as follows (cf. Appendix A.6):
¦l
B = qM1(®)rl
B(®¤) ¡ rl
D(®¤) ¡ mM1(®)2=2: (32)
Note that ® 6= ®¤ is possible. ® is the actual variable still to be chosen, whereas
rl
B(®¤) and rl
D(®¤) are constants ¯xed on the basis of a previously given promise
®¤. Let the bank maximize ¦l
B with respect to ®. For this, we must ¯rst substitute
M¤
1(rl
B1;®) = min(1;®¢qrl
B1=m) (see A.6) into (32). Thus, we have to distinguish
the two cases. For M¤
1(®¤) < 1, the ¯rst-order condition turns out to be
(rl
B¢q)2
m
¡
(rl
B¢q)2
m
¢ ® = 0 , ® = 1:
24For M¤
1(®¤) ¸ 1, on the other hand, (32) is completely independent of ® so that
@¦l
B=@® = 0. The bank might just as well stick to ®¤.
A.9 A Repeated Game Setup
Suppose there are two players i = D;B. Depositors (D) choose between two actions:
either trust (t) the bank and set rl
D1(®) = rl
D1(®¤) or distrust (d) it and set rl
D1(®) =
rl
D1(1). The bank (B) either keeps (k) its promise and chooses ® = ®¤ or breaches
(b) it and chooses ® = 1. We neglect intermediate values because, if going for b, the
bank's dominant choice is ® = 1. Therefore, depositors' best responses are t and
d. Denote this the stage game G. G is sequential, depositors lead and the bank
follows. Thus, the former cannot cheat on the latter, i.e., (d;k) will never be played.
Let there be a probability ± that this stage game G will be repeated at the next
stage and denote the repeated game by G(±). Suppose that ± is close to 1 and let
¿ = 0;1;:::;1 index the (potential) stages of the game. In addition, assume that
the bank gets a non-monetary utility ² from continuation.
Finally, consider the following simple trigger strategy: The two parties play
(t;k) in G¿ unless the bank has played b in G¿¡1. In the latter case, they play (d;b)
forever after (or possibly end the game). In other words, new depositors trust the
bank only if it has had a good record in the past (reputation). A once unfaithful
bank is stigmatized, depositors will not trust it again.
If depositors distrust the bank and play d, the bank is no longer competitive
in credit markets, i.e., ¦db
B = 0. Thus, once a bank has played b, it goes out of
business.
From the solutions of the extensive version of our stage game, we know that
¦tk
B = ¦tk
D = 0, whereas ¦tb
B > 0 and ¦tb
D < 0. These are date ¿ pro¯ts.
If (t;k) is played, though its monetary pro¯t is zero, the bank's pay-o® is ²(1 ¡
±)¡1 which is its expected continuation value.
If (t;b) is played, the bank makes a one-time pro¯t, ¦tb
B = qM(1)rB(®¤)¡rD(®¤)¡
mM(1)2=2 (cf. 5), but forfeits its continuation value.
We now draw down the strategic form representation of G¿.
Bank
k (® = ®¤) b (® = 1)
t (rD(®¤)) 0;²(1 ¡ ±)¡1 ¦tb
D;¦tb
B
Depositors
d (rD(1)) - 0;0
Figure 7: Strategic Form Representation of G¿
The bank remains honest only if ²(1¡±)¡1 ¸ ¦tb
B. We rewrite ¦tb
B by subtracting
¦tb
B = qM(®¤)rB(®¤) ¡ rD(®¤) ¡ mM(®¤)2=2 the value of which is zero. Then plug
in M¤
1(rl
B1;®) = min(1;®¢qrl
B1=m) (see A.6) and rearrange.
Proposition 7 (t,k) is a reputational equilibrium if and only if
m¡1(1 ¡ ®¤)2 ¢ rl
B(®¤)2 ¢ ¢2q=2 ¸ ²(1 ¡ ±)¡1: (33)
The LHS represents the pro¯t from breaching ¦tb
B. Due to the endogeneity of ®¤ and
rl
B, the comparative statics are not obvious. We have therefore simulated it. Figure
8 shows the result. The curves represent the thresholds which the expected value
25of continuation must surpass for given m, qh, and ql. In a sense, their magnitude
signals how "dubious" a bank's promise is.
Figure 8: The bank's pro¯t from playing (t;b)
The ranges where the pro¯t from cheating is zero are the ones where M¤ = 1
so that there really is no commitment problem. The pro¯t from breaching is high
where the trade-o® or tension between monitoring and CRT is the strongest, i.e.,
where monitoring is substantially reduced due to CRT (and is not generally low
because of m). In contrast, e.g., for very high m, 0 < M ¿ 1 even if ® = 1, i.e.,
breaching is not so valuable as it increases monitoring intensity only by a whisker.
A.10 Proof of Proposition 6
The proof is very simple. P sets K as to make K(®¤) = s(®¤) + t(®¤) so that it
breaks even. Assume ®¤ = argminrB = argmin® K(®¤) so that K(®¤) < K(®) for
all ® 6= ®¤. I.e., ®¤ and M¤ are the price-minimal strategy. Denote r¤
B ´ minrB.
Suppose the bank deviated from ®¤ to ® = 1 after it has set rB = r¤
B, and
P would intervene. To break even, P would increase the capital requirement to
K(1) > K(®¤). The bank would monitor with M(1) > M(®¤). But this no longer
represents the price-minimal strategy. The zero-pro¯t equilibrium would require
rB > r¤
B. I.e., at least one party is making a loss. Since, by assumption, depositors
always get 1 and P has intervened and raised K precisely to break even, it must be
the bank. Thus, it will not deviate.
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